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In his 1960 classic “The Constitution of Liberty,” Hayek defines freedom as the absence of
coercion by the government, and describes the various institutions that guarantee it.  He focuses on
two clusters of institutions of free societies, which following his analysis we call English freedom
and American freedom.  Central to English freedom is the idea of rule of law, which refers to the
equality of subjects before the law, and the impartial administration of justice.  The coercion that
English freedom restricts is the power of the sovereign – be it king or Parliament – to interfere with
the administration of justice by the courts.  Parliament makes the laws, but judges enforce them
without interference from Parliament. 
The American idea of freedom, according to Hayek, accepts the British notion of judicial
independence, but goes further and holds that law-making itself is subject to restraints.  The will of
the majority, as expressed by the decisions of the executive or the Parliament, is itself limited by the
constitution, and courts are able to strike down laws which they deem unconstitutional.  Put very
simply, English freedom refers to the inability of law-makers to interfere with the courts, while
American freedom refers to the ability of the courts to interfere with the law-makers. 
Both the English and the American conceptions of freedom are based on a common notion
that the will of the sovereign -- even a democratically elected sovereign -- must be restrained.  Both
reject the idea -- articulated most clearly by Rousseau -- that the democratically elected sovereign
can, on behalf of the people, legitimately act without constraints.  Both the English and the American
conceptions of freedom deal with the limits on government, but refer to different limits.  
In order to restrain the sovereign, the architects of the English and the American freedom
have invented a variety of institutions.  These institutions have been widely adopted around the2  Thus, John Locke (1690, Chapter 11; §137) writes “For all the power the government has, being only for the
good of the society, as it ought not to be arbitrary and at pleasure, so it ought to be exercised by established and
promulgated laws, that both the people may know their duty, and be safe and secure within the limits of the law, and
the rulers, too, kept within their due bounds, and not be tempted by the power they have in their hands to employ it to
purposes, and by such measures as they would not have known, and own not willingly.”
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world, and their merits discussed extensively.  Yet despite extensive discussions, to our knowledge
there has been no attempt to measure the institutional arrangements related to English and American
freedom, and to ask empirically which of these arrangements are in fact successful guarantees of
freedom.  This is precisely what we do in this paper.  We collect information on a variety of
constitutional arrangements in 71 countries related to the organizing themes of English and
American freedom.  Although national constitutions sometimes change (and we consider separately
the sub-sample of countries where constitutions have been very stable), we see them as largely
determined by history and therefore possibly shaping subsequent economic and social outcomes.
        We use these data to examine which constitutional  arrangements  are  associated  with
measures of political and economic freedom in a cross-section of countries.  Perhaps the key
contribution of this paper is to collect data on constitutional variables in a large number of countries
that reflect particular attempts by the framers of these constitutions to guarantee freedom. 
 As we see it, the English conception of freedom is most intimately focused on the prevention
of arbitrary action of the government, which is accomplished through the separation of powers
between the creators and the administrators of laws.  Hayek credits Locke with an early statement
of the doctrine of separation of powers,
2 although the development of this doctrine is typically
associated with Montesquieu (1748).  In constitutional terms, the doctrine of separation of powers
is implemented through the guarantees of judicial independence, and of accountability of all subjects3 “The first maxim of a free state is, that the laws be made by one set of men, and administered by another; in other
words, that the legislative and the judicial character be kept separate.”    (William Paley as quoted by Hayek, page 173).
Less clearly, John Locke (Chapter 11; §136) writes: “...so it serves not as it aught, to determine the rights and fence the
properties of those that live under it, especially where every one is judge, interpreter, and executioner of it too...”. 
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of a commonwealth, including government officials, before the law.
3  
In English history, various attempts at judicial independence begin in the 12
th century, when
Henry II introduces trial by jury, and thereby surrenders at least some powers over dispute resolution
to lay judges (Dawson 1960).  The importance of the jury expands over the following centuries,
including through Magna Carta, although judges continue to be employed by the king. Several
English monarchs, especially the Tudors, are unhappy with this loss of control over adjudication:
they punish disagreeable juries for perjury and create jury-free courts of royal prerogative. The
English Revolution confirms the principle of judicial independence.  The 1701 Act of Settlement
grants judges lifetime appointments as well as independence from Parliament.  
Accordingly, we measure English freedom in terms of the constitutional mandates governing
the appointment terms of judges in high courts.  We focus both on Supreme Courts (the highest
courts of the land), and the administrative courts, which address disputes between citizens and the
government.  We also look at a measure of independence of administrative courts.  Lastly, we look
at what some writers, including Hayek, regard as a crucial protection of judicial independence in
England, namely precedent (or case law) as a source of law.  On this theory, the ability of sovereign
to influence judges is severely limited when prior judicial decisions constrain the sitting judges.   
While restraints on Parliamentary or royal interference with judges are central to English
freedom, the idea of limiting the law-making freedom of Parliament is foreign to the English
constitution.  In fact, in his classic statement of the subject, Dicey (1885) defined the English
constitution in terms of the unconstrained law-making power of Parliament.  Hayek in fact sees this4
feature of the English constitution as posing a severe risk to freedom from the tyranny of the majority
or (to use the French term) the general will.  For this reason, Hayek sees the United States as the
great innovator in the development of freedom in the 19
th century. 
The American idea of freedom is most intimately related to the notion of checks and
balances, referring especially to the power of the Supreme Court to check congressional law-making
against a difficult-to-amend Constitution.  We consider a variety of constitutional measures of
American freedom from this general perspective.  First, we measure the rigidity of a country’s
constitution in terms of the difficulty of modification. Second, we examine the ability of Supreme
or constitutional courts to review the laws passed by parliaments.  Third, and more tentatively, we
consider federalist arrangements as a source of checks and balances.
We examine how these constitutional arrangements influence both economic and political
freedom.  Economic freedom is measured by assessments of the security of property rights in various
countries as well as by an objective measure of the burden of government regulation, namely an
estimate of the number of steps that an entrepreneur must take in order to legally open a business
(Djankov et al. 2002).  Political freedom is measured using indices of democracy, political rights,
and human rights from different sources.    
These data enable us to ask the key question: do the institutions of either English or
American freedom, as reflected in a country’s constitution, make the citizens of that country free?
We find that, holding certain parameters constant, the institutions of English freedom contribute to
both the economic and the political freedom in a country.  The institutions of American freedom
contribute to political freedom, but less clearly to economic freedom.  It is perhaps not entirely
surprising that judicial independence is especially important for economic freedom while judicial5
checks on the legislature for political freedom, but it nonetheless is interesting to know that these
results are confirmed by the data. 
Earlier research finds that common law countries – those whose commercial laws derive from
those of England – score better on various indicators of economic freedom, such as financial
development and lightness of regulation – than do civil law countries (La Porta et al. 1997, 1998,
1999).  Legal origin of commercial laws is an interesting predictor of economic and social outcomes
because most countries have acquired these laws through conquest or transplantation from a
relatively few “mother” origins, namely England, France, Germany and Soviet Russia.  Legal origin
is therefore largely exogenous.  We do not know whether this evidence is explained by greater
politicization of economic life in civil law countries (Damaska  1986, La Porta et al.1999), or by
differences in the legal systems themselves (Coffee 2000, Johnson et al. 2000, Djankov et al. 2001).
We confirm that English legal origin is a strong predictor of economic, but less so of political,
freedom, and ask whether adding our measures of the institutions of English freedom “kills” this
predictive power of  legal origin.  We find that our measures of English freedom reduce the effect
of common law origin on economic freedom in half, which suggests that judicial independence may
be an important reason why English legal origin is associated with greater security of property.  
2. Data.
Construction of the Database and Definition of the Variables.
Our analysis is based on a data set of measures of freedom and its potential determinants in
71 countries. The sample covers all countries in the Maddex (1995) Encyclopedia of Constitutions,
with the exception of transition economies.   The Maddex sample generally includes the richer6
countries, which in fact are the appropriate universe to examine the effectiveness of constitutional
guarantees of freedom, since constitutions are more likely to be followed in these countries.  We
choose not to expand the country coverage to assure the compatibility of our coding with Maddex.
We exclude from the Maddex sample transition economies (Bulgaria, Cambodia, Czech Republic,
Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovak Republic, and Russia) because their laws and institutions have
been changing very rapidly in the 1990s.  The sample does, however, include countries with socialist
constitutions (China, Cuba, Vietnam, and North Korea). The actual number of observations varies
between regressions depending on data availability.  The data, however, are nearly complete for the
constitutional variables, where we supplement the Maddex data with other variables from actual
constitutions.  Table 1 summarizes the definitions and sources for all variables in the paper.
Unlike our constitutional variables, which come from written laws, our measures of freedom
generally come from survey assessments.   We measure economic freedom in two ways.  The first
is an index of the security of property rights, developed by a think tank concerned generally with the
protection of private property -- especially against infringement by the government.  The second
measure (which comes from rules rather than assessments) is the number of different steps that a
start-up has to comply with in order to begin operating as a legal entity.  This measure was developed
by Djankov et al. (2002) as an objective estimate of regulatory interference by the government in
private markets.  We measure political freedom by an index of democracy, an index of political
rights, and an index of human rights -- all taken from different data bases.
The correlations among the measures of freedom within the same category are high.  In the
economic freedom category, countries that score high on property rights tend to require few
procedures to start a business (-0.57 correlation).   In the political freedom category, countries that7
score high on the index of political rights also score high on democracy (0.91 correlation) and high
on human rights (0.90 correlation).  Similarly, countries that score low on democracy tend to score
low on human rights (0.82 correlation).  
Economic and political freedom are also highly positively correlated.  A few countries such
as Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Singapore score high on economic freedom but low on democracy.
Other countries, like Haiti, score low on the former and high on the latter.  But such countries are
an exception not the rule, as economic and political freedom typically go hand-in-hand.  Countries
that score high on property rights also score high on democracy (correlation is 0.60), political rights
(0.68 correlation), and human rights (0.71 correlation).  Similarly, countries that require a large
number of procedures to setup a new business tend to score low in democracy (-0.25 correlation),
political rights (-0.33 correlation),  and human rights (-0.42 correlation).
We relate freedom to two sets of its potential determinants: judicial independence (English
freedom), and checks-and-balances (American freedom).  Our principal contribution is to focus on
de jure variables derived from national constitutions.  These variables reflect the relatively
permanent features of a country’s institutional environment as compared to the de facto  political
outcomes, such as the turnover of politicians, for example.  By collecting these data, we also provide
a new source of information for the comparative study of institutions. 
Recall that the essence of the English view is the enforcement of laws to an independent
judiciary.  We use three proxies for judicial independence.  First,  in some countries judges have life-
long tenure whereas in others they are appointed for a short period of time or even serve at the
pleasure of the president.  When judges have life-long tenure, they are both less susceptible to direct
political pressure and less likely to have been selected by the authorities currently in office.  Because4 Glaeser and Shleifer (2002) argue that the reason that England adopted a jury system, whereas  France did not,
was that England was a more peaceful country than France through most of the last millennium, and therefore did not
need to worry as much as France did about protecting jurors  from intimidation by the powerful local magnates
interested in subverting justice.
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the English view of freedom  stresses the independence of judges adjudicating disputes between
citizens and the state (in freedom of speech cases, contracts, etc.), we focus on the tenure of two sets
of judges: those in the highest ordinary courts, and those in administrative courts. 
In England, the idea of decision-making by independent juries dates back to the 12
th century,
and the history of lifetime tenure of judges to the Act of Settlement in 1701.  Over time, nearly all
the countries following the common law legal tradition adopted this principle.
4  Its importance was
summarized by Alexander Hamilton: “nothing can contribute so much to [the judiciary’s] firmness
and independence as permanency in office, this quality may therefore be justly regarded as an
indispensable ingredient” (Federalist 78).  The approach of civil law countries to judicial tenure is
quite different: a judge usually enters the judiciary at a low level and works his way up the hierarchy
through promotions and assignments from either a council or the ministry of judges (Merryman
1969).  Such promotions are influenced by the government.  After World War II, many civil law
countries introduced constitutional guarantees of the tenure of judges, at least for the higher ranked
courts.  Despite recent convergence, in a number of countries judges serve at the will of the president
(as in Iraq), or their tenure does not exceed that of the legislature (as in Vietnam).
Second, in some countries, citizens can challenge administrative acts of the government only
in administrative courts that form part of the executive branch.  In other countries, in contrast,
citizens can seek redress against administrative acts directly through ordinary courts and/or they can
request the Supreme Court to review decisions made by administrative courts.  Arbitrary government
actions are less likely when the judicial branch can review administrative acts.  In addition, the courts9
ruling on administrative disputes are presumably more independent, the longer their tenure.   Thus
our administrative review variable is a dummy that takes the value of one when the Supreme Court
has jurisdiction over administrative cases and judges ruling over these cases have lifelong tenure.
The historical development of judicial review of administrative cases in England dates back
to the conflict between Parliament, backed by judges and lawyers, and Charles I, which ultimately
led to the independence of the judiciary.  A direct result of this conflict was the concept that ordinary
courts can rule on the lawfulness of executive actions.  As with other institutional features, this idea
was also adopted by the countries in the common law tradition.  In contrast, the French (strict)
interpretation of the principle of separation of powers, did not allow judges to review administrative
acts and decisions.  In France, a parallel institution, Conseil d’Etat, was created following a basic
structure laid down by Napoleon in 1799.  This institution, which is part of the executive branch, has
the power to rule over administrative decisions.
Third, in some countries courts merely interpret laws.  In other countries, courts have
“lawmaking” powers and, moreover, through the doctrine of stare decisis, judicial decisions are
constrained by prior judicial decisions.  Because the power of the precedent restricts the ability of
the government to influence judges, it too serves as a useful measure of judicial independence. 
In many countries, case law exists de-facto although not de-jure (Merryman 1969).  The
French revolution stripped all legislative (and power over administrative acts) from the judicial
system. However, judges in civil law countries do pay attention to precedent (Glendon et al.1982,
pp. 132-134, and Damaska 1986, p. 33).   For example, the career incentives induced by the
hierarchical judicial systems of civil law countries may lead judges to heed precedent even when
case law is not explicitly recognized as a source of law.  Thus, Damaska (1986, p. 37) writes that10
“Firmly tied to the mast of the civil service, lower judges could hear the seductive music of freedom
as Ulysses heard the singing of the sirens.”   
Still, de-jure case law may be important for freedom for two reasons.  First, “...the traditional
conception that a single case has no binding effect seems to have hindered civil law judges and
scholars alike from developing a workable system of precedent.” (Glendon et al. 1982, p. 134).
Second, hierarchical review systems of civil law countries are less likely to allow case law to rule,
thus reducing judicial independence. “The Continental judge does not weigh the symmetry of factual
situations which, under the aegis of stare decisis, permits fine distinctions and thus assures the
flexible growth of the law.  Instead he seeks ever more concrete rules in prior decisions, disregarding
the enveloping factual context.  Assuming the binding nature of this progressive norm concretization,
decisional standards would in time become intolerably rigid, each new decision a drop in the
formation of an ever longer stalactite of norms.  In short, while a judicial organization composed of
loosely hierarchical judges may require a doctrine of binding precedent as an internal ideological
stabilizer, a hierarchical career judiciary may well be better off without it.”  (Damaska 1986, p. 37).
 The  American system, through a written Constitution, endows separate branches  of
government with limiting powers over each other.  In this system of checks-and-balances, no branch
is supreme. We use four variables to capture the importance of checks-and-balances in molding the
political institutions of a country.  
First, in some countries the legislature derives its power and authority from the constitution
and is bound by it when making laws.  In other countries, in contrast, there is no hierarchy of laws
to restrain the power of the legislature either because there is no constitution or because the
legislature can alter it in the same way as it writes new laws.  Thus, a rigid constitution (i.e., one that
is difficult to modify) may constrain the power of the legislature.5  The importance of constitutional review was not lost to the framers of the constitution.  For example, Alexander
Hamilton writes (Federalist Papers, no. 78): "The complete independence of the courts of justice is peculiarly essential
in a limited constitution. By a limited constitution, I understand one, which contains certain specified exceptions to the
legislative authority; such, for instance, as that it shall pass no bills of attainder, no ex post facto laws, and the like.
Limitations of this kind can be preserved in practice no other way than through the medium of the courts of justice;
whose duty it must be to declare all acts contrary to the manifest tenor of the constitution void. Without this, all the
reservations of particular rights or privileges would amount to nothing.”
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Historically, the U.S. was the first country to introduce a rigid constitution.  A proposed
amendment to the American constitution requires either a two thirds majority in both chambers of
congress or the organization of a convention called by at least two thirds of the states.  In addition,
the ratification by either the legislatures or conventions of three-fourths of the states is needed.  In
contrast, the U.K. has a flexible constitution since an Act of Parliament can make changes to all
constitutional institutions and rules.  In the 19
th and 20
th centuries, most countries that passed new
constitutions opted for the American “rigid” approach.  Thus, in most countries, the text of the
constitution provides for a special procedure for changing it, which usually involves a combination
of majority or supermajority in legislature, referendum by the population, approval of the head of
state, or approval of a majority of sub-national legislatures.  Finally, only under a rigid constitution
is it possible to establish an institutional arrangement to control the conformity of legislation with
the constitution, a concept that we turn to next.  
Second,  in some countries, the constitutionality of laws cannot be challenged.   In other
countries, however, laws are reviewed by specialized constitutional courts and/or by ordinary courts
as they hear cases.  The availability of constitutional review may constrain the power of the
legislative branch to make laws.
5  
In practice, constitutional review may be carried out by the judiciary (as in the US) or by a
special constitutional court outside of the judicial system (as in many continental European
countries).  The constitutional review performed by ordinary courts is typically specific,  a posteriori12
and, in principle, court decisions apply only inter-partes.  In contrast, specialized constitutional
courts are a relatively new phenomenon.  They were first introduced in Austria in 1920 and spread
throughout Europe after World War II as a response to the excesses of Nazi Germany.   When
constitutional review is carried out by specialized courts, it is typically abstract, a priori (although,
a posteriori review is also possible), and has erga omnes effects.  Importantly, judges in
constitutional review courts are typically political appointees without life-long tenure.  The two
systems of constitutional review are not mutually exclusive.  A few countries such as Chile and
South Africa have both systems of review in place.
Independently of whether the Supreme or the Constitutional court performs the constitutional
review, countries also differ in the scope of such review.  In some countries, such the U.S., Germany,
Japan, and Brazil, the institutions established to decide on the constitutionality of laws and actions
enjoy the right of full review.  As an example, the Japanese constitution stipulates that the Supreme
Court is the court of last resort, with power to determine the constitutionality of any law, order,
regulation, or official act.  In other countries, the review of constitutionality is limited in the sense
that it is only available to certain persons or entities, or is restricted to certain aspects of the
constitution.  In France, the Constitutional Council established in 1958 rules on the constitutionality
of laws before they are promulgated, but only the president, premier, the presidents of the two
legislative houses, or sixty members of either house can make a request for a review.  Moreover,
once the law has been enacted, the Constitutional Council has no power to nullify it.  Finally, a
number of countries, such as China, Finland, Iran, North Korea, or the U.K. have no review at all.
In North Korea, the absence of the power of judicial review by the courts is the consequence of the
concentration of all power in the leadership of the communist party, whereas in the U.K., the lack13
of review derives from the absolute supremacy of Parliament.   
Third, in some countries power is shared between a central government and the states in a
federal system.   In other countries, all power rests with the central government.  A federal system
may be an important element of a system of checks-and-balances if it introduces competition among
different levels of government and impedes their ability to act unilaterally (Riker 1964). 
The creation of a federal system as an instrument to restrain the power of the national
legislature  was another American constitutional invention.  The founding fathers envisioned the
sharing of power between national and state legislatures as an effective limit on all government.
Looking at the U.S., Lord Acton considered this institutional setup “the most efficacious and most
congenial of all checks on democracy” (quoted in Hayek 1960, p. 184).  Despite the success of the
American federal model, few countries have adopted a federal structure of their government in the
last 200 years.  In general, the vast majority of nation-states, including Belgium, France, Great
Britain, the Scandinavian countries, and most of Latin American and African countries,  have unitary
systems of government.    
As we have indicated in the introduction, one motivation for this paper is to relate our
findings to those on the predictive power of legal origin.  As a start, the next section organizes the
data by legal origin of the country’s commercial laws.  In section 4, we examine the relationship
between the institutions we measure and legal origin.
Descriptive Statistics.
Table 2 presents our data on the institutions of freedom.  The variables are listed by country,
and countries are organized by the legal origin of their commercial laws.  6 Administrative Court judges always have life-long tenure in ELO and ScLO countries.  However, Administrative
Court judges have life-long tenure in only 62% of FLO countries, 50% of GLO countries, and never in SoLO countries.
Administrative Court judges are appointed for more than six years, albeit not for life, in 50% of GLO countries and
18.8% of FLO ones.   Finally, the tenure of Administrative Court judges is shorter than six years  in 18.8% of FLO
countries and in all SoLO countries.
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Consider our proxies for English freedom first.  The results for the tenure of Supreme and
Administrative Court judges are very similar and we only discuss the former.  In 54 out of 70
countries for which we have the data, including the UK and the US, Supreme Court judges are
appointed for life (SC tenure=2).  In contrast,  Supreme Court judges are appointed for terms of more
than six years, but less than life, (SC tenure=1) in 9 countries, including Japan, Mexico, Korea, and
Switzerland.  Finally,  Supreme Court judges are appointed for less than six years in Algeria, China,
Cuba, Honduras, Iraq, North Korea, and Vietnam (SC tenure=0). 
As these examples suggest, tenure of Supreme Court judges varies among legal origins.
Supreme Court judges have life-long tenure in all countries of English (ELO) and Scandinavian legal
origin (ScLO), but in only 71.9% of French-legal-origin (FLO) countries, 50% of German-legal-
origin ones (GLO), and never in Socialist-legal-origin (SoLO) countries.  Supreme Court judges are
appointed for more than six years, albeit not for life, in 50% of GLO countries and 18.8% of FLO
ones.   Finally, the tenure of Supreme Court judges is shorter than six years (SC tenure=0) in 9.4%
of FLO countries and in all SoLO countries.
6
Our next variable deals with the nature of administrative review.  Many key disputes in this
area are adjudicated by administrative judges.  However, whereas in 19 countries, including France,
the rulings of administrative judges are final, in 51 countries, such as the UK and the US, they can
be appealed to judges in ordinary courts.  A key implication of the ability to appeal administrative
sentences in ordinary courts is that, as a result, the Supreme Court has ultimate jurisdiction over the15
rulings of the administrative courts.   
Judges in ELO and ScLO countries have more power over administrative cases than judges
in other legal origins. Whereas the Supreme Court has ultimate control over administrative cases in
91.3% of ELO and in 80% of ScLO countries, it only does so in 60.6% of FLO, and 66.7% of GLO
and SoLO countries (only the ELO/FLO difference is statistically significant).  The Supreme Court
has jurisdiction over administrative cases even in Cuba.  However, administrative review in Cuba,
as in all other SoLO countries, is conducted by judges without life-long tenure. 
The example of Cuba suggests that the ability of the Supreme Court to review sentences by
administrative courts  may not effectively restrain the power of the executive unless coupled with
independent (i.e., tenured) judges.  For this reason, we combine the administrative review and tenure
variables in our measure. We find that administrative review is conducted by judges with life-long
tenure and subject to Supreme Court review (power of administrative judge  = 1) in 91.3% of ELO
countries, 80% of ScLO countries, 40.6% of FLO countries, 16.7% of GLO countries, and never in
SoLO countries.
The availability of case law as a legitimate source of law is our final proxy for English
freedom.  As expected, case law is a source of law in all ELO countries but Thailand, which is
difficult to classify anyhow (see La Porta et al. 1998).  Case law is also a source of law in all ScLO
countries and in 83.3% of GLO countries. On the other hand, case law is never a source of law in
SoLO countries.  FLO countries occupy an intermediate position: case law is a source of law in
28.1% of the FLO countries (many of them are Latin American countries which modeled their
constitutions after the US one).  These differences in case law across legal origins are magnified
when combined with the previous results on the tenure of the Supreme Court judges (i.e., of those7 Specialized courts are common in FLO and GLO, but rare in ELO and ScLO, countries.
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who ultimately interpret the law).  For example, not only do Supreme Court judges have law-making
power in ELO and ScLO countries but they also have life-long tenure.   Conversely, Supreme Court
judges in SoLO countries lack both lawmaking power and life-long tenure.
Turning to the American view of freedom, begin with the rigidity of the constitution.  The
constitution can be changed by a simple law (Rigidity = 1) in countries such as Israel and the U.K.
In Sweden (Rigidity = 2) a proposal to amend the constitution needs the approval of the majority of
legislature (1 point) twice, the second time after a new parliament is elected (1 point).  Changing the
constitution is harder in Australia (Rigidity = 3), where a majority (1 point) in both houses (1 point)
have to pass the amendment and a referendum has to be organized (1 point).  In Japan (Rigidity =
4), constitutional changes can be made often after the approval of a supermajority of two thirds of
members (2 points) in each house (1 point) of parliament, and a referendum (1 point).  The rigidity
of the constitution shows little variation among legal origins, and the differences are never
statistically significant. 
The nature of the judiciary review is our second American freedom proxy. As we have
indicated earlier, countries vary greatly in the scope of constitutional review. Our variable ranges
from full review (value of 2), such as in Austria, Germany, Ghana, and the U.S., to limited review
(value of 1) in countries such as Belgium, France, Honduras, and Jordan, to no review (value of 0)
in China, Cuba, the Netherlands, and the U.K.   
A few patterns emerge from these data. Although there is no review of the constitution in
SoLO countries, it exists in roughly 80-85% of the countries of each of the remaining four legal
origins.
7  Differences in the incidence of constitutional review among legal origin are not statistically17
significant except with regards to SoLO countries which have sharply lower levels of review.
Perhaps this is to be expected in light of the fact that constitutional review, as an American
innovation, is less tied to legal origin than are the English freedom variables.
   Defining a federation involves many judgement calls (Riker 1964).  Some countries, such
as Uruguay, have a unitary form of government and are clearly not federations.  Other countries, such
as the United States, are clearly federations as they have both a federal government and local
governments with substantial autonomy.  Still other countries,  such as Argentina, are nominally
federations although local governments are weak.  In what follows, a country is defined as a
federation when sub-federal units have “substantial” fiscal authority.  Following this definition,
federations turn out to be rather rare: there are only eight of them in our sample of 71 countries.
There are no federal governments among ScLO and SoLO countries.  Federations are relatively rare
in FLO countries (6.1%; Belgium and Chile) and ELO countries (17.4%; Australia, Canada, South
Africa, and the United States), but more likely in GLO countries (33.3%; Germany and Switzerland).
Not surprisingly, English and American freedom capture different aspects of the data.
English freedom varies with legal origin.  Supreme Court judges in ELO and ScLO countries are
most independent and powerful: they are appointed for life, their decisions are sources of law, and
they tend to have power to control administrative acts.  In contrast, Supreme Court judges in SoLO
countries are least independent and powerful: they have short appointments and lack lawmaking
power.  The independence and power of judges in FLO and GLO takes intermediate values between
these extremes.  Unlike English freedom, American freedom is not consistently related to legal
origin.  The rigidity of the constitution and the incidence of constitutional review do not vary much
across legal origins (SoLO countries are different from other groups as they don’t have constitutional8 Acemoglu et al. (2001) argue that settler mortality is a better variable for thinking about the influence of
geography on institutions than latitude, especially for colonies.  We have only 27 colonies with data on settler mortality
in our sample, and hence stick with the more conventional geographic control.
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review). Federalism also yields a different ranking of legal origins than English freedom variables.
Federations are most likely in GLO countries and least likely in ScLO and SoLO countries.
The correlations among the various guarantees of freedom are presented in Table 2a.  The
data show that the correlations among the institutions of English freedom are generally high and
statistically significant, whereas those among the three institutions of American freedom we measure
are low  and insignificant (except that between judiciary review and the rigidity of constitution). The
correlations between the institutions of English and American freedom are also generally low and
insignificant, except that judiciary review is strongly correlated with tenure of supreme and
administrative courts.  Even these correlations, however, are on the order of .33-.34.  These data
confirm the evidence in Table 2 that our measures of English and American freedom do indeed
reflect different aspects of the data, and are not just raw measures of institutional goodness.
Furthermore, we have run regressions of our guarantees of freedom on the logarithm of per capita
income.  The regressions show that these measures are not higher in richer countries. 
 
3. Regression Results.
In this section we present regressions of the determinants of freedom.  Following our earlier
work (La Porta et al. 1999), we include both latitude and ethnolinguistic fractionalization as controls
in all regressions.  We include latitude because temperate zones have more productive agriculture
and healthier climates, which might have enabled them to develop better economies and institutions
(Landes 1998, Acemoglu et al. 2001).
8  We include ethnolinguistic fractionalization because both19
the available evidence (e.g., Easterly and Levine 1997) and theory (e.g., Alesina et al. 1999) suggest
that ruling groups in ethnically heterogeneous societies may fashion government policies that
expropriate (or kill) ethnic losers, restrict their freedom of opposition, and limit the production of
public goods.  As a result, both economic and political freedom may suffer when ethnic
heterogeneity is high. 
We present each regression with and without controlling for the logarithm of per-capita
income.  The appropriateness of including per capita income control in these regressions is
questionable.  We have gone to great lengths to focus on the arguably exogenous independent
variables, derived from national constitutions.  In contrast, per capita income is obviously
endogenous.  The motivation for including per-capita income is that development itself improves
the performance of the institutions guaranteeing freedom.  For example, courts may only be able to
restrain governments when they are adequately funded and employ well-trained judges (and both of
those conditions are more likely to hold when per-capita income is high).  The arguments for
excluding per capita income are also powerful.  We have checked that our constitutional measures
of English and American freedom are not themselves higher in richer countries. Including per-capita
income may also cause estimation problems if  restraints on the government as reflected in English
or American freedoms themselves enhance output. For example, if  independent judiciaries boost
per-capita income, which in turn benefits economic freedom, then controlling for per capita income
inappropriately reduces the overall estimated effect of independent judiciaries on freedom.  We
present the results both ways, but remain quite skeptical that income belongs in the regressions.
While results vary among regressions, we generally find, not surprisingly, that both economic
and political freedom are higher in richer countries, and in countries further away from the equator.20
Perhaps more surprisingly, we do not find that ethnolinguistic fractionalization is associated with
lower levels of freedom; in most regressions, the coefficient on this variable is insignificant.  Perhaps
most importantly for the discussion to follow, the effects of the constitutional variables that we are
interested do not disappear when we introduce controls in the regressions.  As a consequence, our
discussion on the effects of the guarantees of freedom will generally ignore these controls.   
English freedom.
We present the results regarding tenure of the Supreme and administrative courts,
administrative review, and case law  (i.e., our English freedom proxies) in Tables 3 through 6.  The
results on the effects of longer tenure for administrative and Supreme court judges are similar and
we discuss them jointly (Tables 3 and 4).  Longer tenure for judges in either court has a beneficial
effect on both economic and political freedom.  The estimated coefficients typically imply that tenure
for judges has a large impact on freedom.  For example, going from no-tenure to life-long tenure for
Supreme Court judges is associated with an increase of 1.98 points in property rights and 4.15 points
in democracy.  These are large numbers given that property rights is measured on a 1-5 scale and has
standard deviation of 1.31 while democracy is measured on a 0-10 scale and has a 4.18 standard
deviation.  To make these estimates more concrete, note that Egypt, India, and Mexico have a
property-rights score of 3 (2 points away from a perfect score), and that Zambia has a democracy
score of 6 (4 points away from a perfect score).
Recall that our measure of the power of the administrative law judges takes the value of 1
if the Supreme Court has control over administrative cases and judges ruling over administrative
cases have life-long tenure, and 0 otherwise.  The results for this measure are presented in Table 5.9 To put these estimates in perspective recall that the standard deviation of property rights is 1.31 while that of
democracy is 4.18.  Italy, Spain, and Turkey are examples of countries that have a property-rights score of 4 (i.e., 1 point
away from a perfect score).  France, India, and Venezuela are examples of countries that have a democracy score of 8
(i.e, 2 points away from a perfect score). 
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Administrative review by independent judges has strong benefits for  both economic and political
freedom.  These results suggest that administrative review has a large effect on freedom when carried
out by judges with life-long tenure.   The estimated coefficients imply that  going from no-review
to review-cum-tenured-judges is associated with an increase of 0.96 points in property rights and
2.23 points in democracy.
9
    Table 6 shows that case law has a statistically significant positive effect on economic
freedom and democracy, but not on political and human rights.  The estimated coefficients suggest
that giving judges law-making power is associated with an increase of 1.05 points in property rights
and 2.06 points in democracy.  
In summary, proxies for judicial independence are associated with more economic and
political freedom, with and without per capita income controls.   These results support the hypothesis
that judicial independence fosters both economic and political freedom. 
American freedom.
We present regressions using the rigidity of constitutions, constitutional review and
federalism as independent variables (i.e., our American freedom proxies) in Tables 7 through 9.
Consistent with the findings in Section 2, the results on the rigidity of the constitution are mostly
insignificant.  The results for judiciary review are more interesting.   Recall that such review may
be carried out by the judiciary (as in the U.S.) or by a special constitutional court outside of the
judicial system (as in many continental European countries). Table 8 shows that judiciary review is10 To make the effect of judiciary review on democracy, political rights, and human rights concrete note that
Nicaragua, Thailand, and Zambia have democracy scores of 6 (i.e., 4 points away from a perfect score); Nepal, Pakistan,
and Zambia have political-rights scores of 5 (i.e., 2 points away from a perfect score); and Nicaragua and Venezuela
have human rights scores of 75 (i.e., 24 points away from the highest score in the sample). 
11  We also examined the role of tenure in judiciary review (defined the same way as the other tenure variables) and
found that tenure for the judge ruling over constitutional matters is associated with more property rights and less
burdensome regulation of entry (with and without per-capita income).  We do not report these results.
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a powerful predictor of all measures of political freedom.  There is weaker evidence that judiciary
review is associated with more secure property rights, whereas the coefficient on the judiciary review
in the number of procedures regression is of the “wrong” sign.  The effect on political freedom is
large.  Moving from a regime of no judiciary review to full review raises the score by  4.09 for
democracy  (std of 4.18), and 2.39 for political rights (std of 2.27), and 27.12 for human rights (std
of 24.77) in the regressions that do not include per-capita income.
10, 11  
   Table 9 presents the results on federalism. Federations appear not to have better measures
of economic freedom, but they generally do have higher scores on political freedom.  In this respect,
the general pattern of results is similar to those for judiciary review. 
  In summary, the results in Tables 7-9 support the hypothesis that the institutions of checks
and balances are associated with political, but not economic, freedom.     
A Horse Race
We next investigate whether the institutions of English and American freedom have
differential effects on the political and economic outcomes by including in each regression one
measure of each type of freedom.  Judiciary review is our preferred measure of American freedom,
and the power of administrative judge of English freedom. (Other measures yield similar results.)
The results in Table 10 confirm our previous findings.  They show that, in a horse race, the23
power of the administrative judge predicts economic, but less clearly political, freedom.  Judiciary
review predicts political, but not economic, freedom.  
The interpretation of this evidence is intuitively plausible.  Economic freedom in general, and
the security of property rights from government abuse and regulation in particular, are likely to
depend on the ability of courts to resolve commercial disputes without government intervention, and
on the accountability of government officials in such disputes to ordinary courts.  These are, of
course, precisely the institutions of judicial independence we use to measure English freedom.
Political freedom depends additionally on limiting coercion by the government, accomplished to a
large extent through checks and balances.   The institutions of American freedom in general, and
judiciary review in particular, aim precisely to check such coercion. 
4. Legal Origins.
As mentioned in the introduction, recent research shows that the origin of a country’s
commercial laws is a strong predictor of many economic and social outcomes. Some studies have
attributed this effect to the greater political centralization of socialist and civil law countries than that
of common law countries; others focused on the attributes of the legal systems themselves.  
In Table 11, we present the results of regressions similar to those reported in La Porta et al.
(1999), but using this paper’s five measures of freedom as dependent variables.  The omitted
“dummy” in the regression is French legal origin.  Table 11 documents two facts.  First, compared
to French legal origin (FLO) countries, SoLo countries lag in both the security of property rights and
all measures of political freedom.  This finding is unsurprising, and we do not develop it.  Second,
compared to FLO countries, ELO countries regulate entry less heavily (see also Djankov et al. 2002)24
and have higher property rights scores (see also La Porta et al. 1999).  In contrast, the positive effect
of the ELO on political rights is not statistically significant. 
 The results in Table 11 raise the question of whether the institutions of judicial independence
that we have associated with English freedom are the source of the beneficial effect of English legal
origin on economic freedom.  We examine this question empirically in Table 12, where we use as
independent variables both legal origins and the institutions of English freedom.  In Panel A, the
dependent variable is the property rights index; in Panel B, it is the number of procedures.   The
results in both panels show that the addition of our measures of judicial independence reduces the
magnitude of the coefficient on English legal origin roughly in half, but does not eliminate its
statistical significance.  In the two panels, 5 out of 8 coefficients on our measures of judicial
independence are statistically significant at a 10% or better level.
What can we make of these results?  We have shown in Section 3 that our measures of
judicial independence are strong predictors of economic freedom.  Table 12 suggests  that judicial
independence is part of the reason why common law is associated with greater economic freedom,
but not the whole story.  The possibility that some other aspect of the legal system is crucial, such
as the ability of judges to use “smell tests”rather than bright line rules (Coffee 2000, Johnson et al.
2000), remains open. So does the possibility that broader political factors correlated with common
law are responsible for greater economic freedom (Glaeser and Shleifer 2002, La Porta et al. 1999).
5. Robustness.  
One issue in our analysis is whether constitutional rules are exogenous.  After all, some
countries occasionally change their constitutions in response to political circumstances that may25
themselves be captured by our measures of freedom.  To address this problem, we repeat the analysis
using a sample of 44 countries that have not changed their constitutions since 1980.   All of our basic
results survive, except the influence of the Supreme Court tenure variable becomes weaker.  These
results indicate that our findings are driven by pre-determined constitutional variables, and alleviate
the concern that constitutions accommodate rapidly changing political circumstances.    
A closely related objection is that both the levels of freedom and constitutional rules are then
determined by some omitted permanent factors, giving rise to spurious correlations.  We note that
we control for geography, ethno-linguistic fractionalization, and per capita income in our regressions,
which should at least partially deal with this problem.  Another way to possibly address it is by
focusing on former colonies, many of which have borrowed significant parts of their constitutional
and other rules from their former colonizers (see La Porta et al. 1998, Djankov et al. 2001).  For
these colonies, it may be more convincing to treat constitutional rules as exogenous.   We repeat our
analysis for the 43 countries in the sample that are former colonies.   All of our results survive and
if anything become stronger.  This evidence mitigates the concern that the results are driven by
omitted factors shaping both the freedoms and their constitutional guarantees.  Needless to say,
however, this concern cannot be removed entirely within our empirical framework.
Finally, we have presented the results in this paper using individual measures of English and
American freedom – largely to understand which constitutional guarantees appear to matter.  One
can alternatively make composite indices of English and American freedom respectively, by
averaging for each country its scores on each dimension of freedom.  We have done that, and
repeated the analysis for the resulting indices of English and American freedom.  Not surprisingly,
the results work as well or better for the indices as they do for the components.26
6. Conclusion.
In this paper, we consider two conceptually distinct ideas of how the will of the sovereign
– even a democratically elected sovereign – must be restrained to guarantee economic and political
freedom of the subjects.  The English idea of freedom holds the separation of powers between the
creators and the administrators of laws, implemented through the independent judiciary, to be the
crucial source of such guarantees.  The American idea of freedom sees checks and balances, and in
particular constraints on the lawmakers by the judiciary, as a key source of such guarantees.  By
examining the constitutions of 71 countries, we attempt to measure the institutional arrangements
that capture the English and the American ideas of freedom in different countries, and to assess the
consequences of these arrangements for economic and political freedom.
   The data show that the institutions of English freedom are associated with both greater
economic and political freedom, whereas those of American freedom are important primarily for
political freedom. These results are consistent with the intuition that dispute resolution by
independent judges are key for economic law and order, whereas political freedom is achieved
additionally through a system of checks on governmental power.  
We then go on to address the puzzle of a strong predictive power of common law legal origin
for economic freedom.  We find that our measures of judicial independence reduce the common law
effect in half, but do not wipe it out.  We take this evidence to suggest that judicial independence is
a potentially important source of economic freedom, which might explain at least part of the
persistent finding of greater such freedom in the common law countries. 27
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This table describes the variables collected for the 71 countries included in our study.  The information
that is provided is the name of the variable, the range of values, and the sources from which the variable
was collected.  For convenience some variables are assigned a label, which appears in parentheses next to
the name of the variable.
1.  Dependent variables:
Property rights index:
A rating of property rights in each country in 1997 (on a scale from 1 to 5).  The more protection private
property receives, the higher the score.  The score is based, broadly, on the degree of legal protection of private
property, the extent to which the government protects and enforces laws that protect private property, the
probability that the government will expropriate private property, and the country's legal protection of private
property.  Source: Holmes et al. (1997).
Number of procedures:
This variable measures the number of different steps that a start-up has to comply with in order to obtain a
legal status, i.e. to start operating as a legal entity.  The number of procedures ranges in the sample from 2 to
19.  Source: Djankov et al. (2000).
Democracy index:
Democracy score for the year 1994, except for Liberia where the latest available year (1989) was used. Ranges
from 0 to 10, with lower values indicating a less democratic environment.  Source: Gurr and Jaggers (1996).
Political rights index:
Index of political rights in 1996 (on a scale from 1 to 7).  Higher ratings indicate countries that come closer to
the ideals suggested by the checklist questions of: (1) free and fair elections; (2) those elected rule; (3) there
are competitive parties or other competitive political groupings; (4) the opposition has an important role and
power; and (5) the entities have self-determination or an extremely high degree of autonomy.  Source:
Freedom House (1996b).
Human rights index:
A measure of 37 criteria based on the rights enumerated in the three major UN treaties: 1948 Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, 1996 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, International
Covenant on Economics, Social, and Cultural Rights. Ranges from 17 to 99 in the sample, with higher scores
indicating better human rights. Source: Humana (1992).
2.  Independent Variables:
Legal origin  (LO):
Identifies the legal origin of the Company Law or Commercial Code of each country.  There are five possible
origins: (1) English Common Law; (2) French Commercial Code; (3) German Commercial Code; (4)
Scandinavian Commercial Code; and (5) Socialist/Communist laws.  Source: La Porta et al. (1998), extended
using Reynolds and Flores (1989); and Central Intelligence Agency (1996).
Tenure of Supreme Court judges  (SC tenure):
This variable measures the tenure of Supreme Court judges (highest court in any country). The variable takes
three possible values: 2 - if tenure is lifelong, 1 - if tenure is more than six year but not lifelong, 0 - if tenure is
less than six year. Source: collected mainly from the constitutions of countries as well as secondary sources.
Tenure of administrative court judges  (AC tenure):
This variable measures the tenure of the highest ranked judges ruling administrative cases. The variable takes
three possible values: 2 - if tenure is lifelong, 1 - if tenure is more than six year but not lifelong, 0 - if tenure is
less than six year. Source: collected mainly from the constitutions of countries as well as secondary sources.Supreme Court control over administrative cases  (SC control AC):
This variable measures whether the Supreme Court in a country has control over administrative issues. The
variable takes two possible values: 1 - if the administrative court is the Supreme Court or if cases judged by
administrative courts can be appealed to the Supreme Court, 0 - if an administrative court exists but the
Supreme Court has no power over it, or if there is no court that rules over the acts of the administration.
Source: collected mainly from the constitutions of countries as well as secondary sources.
Power of administrative law judges over executive  (Power of admin. judge):
This variable combines the Tenure of administrative court judges variable with a variable measuring Supreme
Court control over administrative cases. The variable is a dummy taking value 1 if administrative law judges
have lifelong tenure and if either the administrative court is the Supreme Court or if cases judged by
administrative courts can be appealed to the Supreme Court, 0 otherwise. Source: collected mainly from the
constitutions of countries as well as secondary sources, and Maddex (1995).
Case law:
This variable is a dummy taking value 1 if judicial decisions in a given country are a source of law, 0
otherwise. Source: Rene (1973).
Rigidity of Constitution:
This variable measures (on a scale from 1 to 4) how hard it is to change the constitution in a given country.
One point each is given if the approval of the majority of the legislature, the chief of state and a referendum is
necessary in order to change the constitution. An additional point is given for each of the following: if a
supermajority in the legislature (more than 66% of votes) is needed, if both houses of the legislature have to
approve, if the legislature has to approve the amendment in two consecutive legislative terms or if the approval
of a majority of state legislature is required.  Source: Maddex (1995).
Judiciary review:
This variable measures the extent to which judges (either Supreme Court or constitutional court) have the
power to review the constitutionality of laws in a given country. The variable takes two values: 2- if there is
full review of constitutionality of laws, 1 - if there is limited review of constitutionality of, 0 - if there is no
review of  constitutionality of laws. Source: Maddex (1995).
Federalism:
This variable is a dummy for federalism. The variable takes value 1 if sub-federal units in a state have
substantive fiscal authority, 0 otherwise. Source: Henisz (1998).
Ethnolinguistic fractionalization:
Average value of five different indices of ethnolinguistic fractionalization.  Its value ranges from 0 to 1. The
five component indices are:  (1) index of ethnolinguistic fractionalization in 1960, which measures the
probability that two randomly selected people from a given country will not belong to the same ethnolinguistic
group (the index is based on the number and size of population groups as distinguished by their ethnic and
linguistic status); (2) and (3) probability of two randomly selected individuals speaking different languages; (4)
percent of the population not speaking the official language; and (5) percent of the population not speaking the
most widely used language.  Sources: Easterly and Levine (1997); the sources of the components of the
average index are: (1) Bruk (1964);  (2) Muller (1964); (3) Roberts (1962); (4) Gunnemark (1991);  (5)
Gunnemark (1991).
Latitude:
The absolute value of the latitude of the country, scaled to take values between 0 and 1.  Source: Central
Intelligence Agency (1996).
Ln GDP per capita:
Logarithm of gross domestic product per capita in US dollars for 1998. Ranges from 4.5 to 10.5 in the sample.
Source: United Nations (2000).Table 2: Independent variables by country and Legal origin
Country
Australia    2    2    1    1   1   3    2    1
Bangladesh    2    2    1    1   1   2    2    0
Canada    2    2    1    1   1   3    1    1
Ghana    2    2    1    1   1   2    2    0
India    2    2    1    1   1   3    2    0
Ireland    2    2    1    1   1   3    2    0
Israel    2    2    1    1   1   1    0    0
Kenya    2    2    1    1   1   1    2    0
Liberia    2    2    1    1   1   3    2    0
Malaysia    2    2    1    1   1   2    1    0
Nepal    2    2    1    1   1   3    2    0
New Zealand    2    2    1    1   1   1    0    0
Nigeria    2    2    1    1   1   4    2    0
Pakistan    2    2    1    1   1   4    1    0
Saudi Arabia    2    2    0    0   1   1    0    0
Singapore    2    2    1    1   1   2    2    0
South Africa    2    2    1    1   1   2    2    1
Thailand    2    2    0    0   0   4    1    0
Uganda    2    2    1    1   1   2    2    0
United Kingdom    2    2    1    1   1   1    0    0
United States    2    2    1    1   1   3    2    1
Zambia    2    2    1    1   1   2    1    0
Zimbabwe    2    2    1    1   1   3    1    0
English LO average
      AC tenure     SC control AC         Power of 
This table classifies countries by Legal origin and shows the value of each independent variable for each country. Panel A shows the
values for English Legal origin countries; Panel B shows the values for French Legal origin countries; Panel C shows the values for
German, Scandinavian, and Socialist Legal origin countries; and Panel D shows the tests (t-statistics) of differences in means for the
different legal origins.  Variables are further defined in Table 1.
2.00 0.91 0.91 0.96 2.39 1.39
    admin. judge   Constitution       review
0.17
AMERICAN FREEDOM ENGLISH FREEDOM
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    Case law     Rigidity of      Judiciary      Federalism       SC tenureCountry
Algeria    0    0    1    0   0   4    1    0
Argentina    2    2    1    1   1   2    2    0
Belgium    2    2    1    1   0   3    1    1
Brazil    2    2    1    1   0   2    2    1
Chile    2    2    1    1   0   3    1    0
Colombia    1    1    0    0   0   2    2    0
Ecuador    2    2    1    1   1   3    2    0
Egypt, Arab Republic    2    2    1    1   0   3    2    0
Ethiopia    2    2    1    1   0   3    1    0
France    2    0    0    0   0   3    1    0
Greece    2    2    0    0   0   2    2    0
Haiti    1    1    1    0   0   4    1    0
Honduras    0    0    1    0   1   3    1    0
Indonesia    2    2    1    1   1   2    0    0
Iran, Islamic    2    0    0    0   0   1    0    0
Iraq    0    0    0    0   0   1    0    0
Italy    2    2    0    0   0   2    2    0
Jordan    2    2    1    1   1   3    1    0
Kuwait    2    2    0    0   0   3    1    0
Lebanon    2    2    0    0   0   3    1    0
Libya . .    1 . .   1    0    0
Mexico    1    1    0    0   0   3    2    0
Mozambique    2    2    0    0   0   2    2    0
Netherlands    2    2    1    1   0   4    0    0
Nicaragua    1    1    1    0   0   2    1    0
Panama    1    1    1    0   0   2    2    0
Peru    2    2    1    1   1   2    2    0
Philippines    2    2    1    1   1   2    2    0
Portugal    2    0    0    0   1   2    2    0
Spain    2    2    1    1   0   3    1    0
Syrian Arab Republic    2    2    0    0   0   3    1    0
Turkey    2    2    0    0   1   2    1    0
Venezuela    1    1    1    0   0   2    2    0
French LO average
      SC tenure      AC tenure     SC control AC         Power of      Case law     Rigidity of      Judiciary      Federalism
0.41 0.28 2.48 1.27 0.06
ENGLISH FREEDOM AMERICAN FREEDOM
Panel B: Data for countries of French Legal origin
    admin. judge   Constitution       review
1.63 1.44 0.61Country
Austria    2    2    0    0   0   2    2    0
Germany    2    2    0    0   1   3    2    1
Japan    1    1    1    0   1   4    2    0
South Korea    1    1    1    0   1   3    2    0
Switzerland    1    1    1    0   1   2    0    1
Taiwan    2    2    1    1   1   2    2    0
German LO average
Denmark    2    2    1    1   1   3    2    0
Finland    2    2    1    1   1   2    0    0
Iceland    2    2    1    1   1   4    2    0
Norway    2    2    1    1   1   3    2    0
Sweden    2    2    0    0   1   2    1    0
Scandinavian LO average
China    0    0    1    0   0   2    0    0
Cuba    0    0    1    0   0   2    0    0
North Korea    0    0 .    0 .   2    0    0
Vietnam    0    0    0    0   0   2    0    0
Socialist LO average
      SC tenure      AC tenure     SC control AC         Power of      Case law     Rigidity of      Judiciary      Federalism
    admin. judge   Constitution       review
0.00 0.00 0.67 0.00 2.00 0.00
2.00 2.00 0.80 0.80
0.17
0.00 0.00
0.00 1.40 2.80 1.00
ENGLISH FREEDOM AMERICAN FREEDOM
Panel C: Data for countries of German, Scandinavian, and Socialist Legal origin
0.83 2.67 1.67 0.33 1.50 1.50 0.67Comparison Groups
English vs. French LO 2.7181 a 3.3602 a 2.6659 b 4.3686 a 6.5996 a -0.3918 0.5855 1.3464
English vs. German LO 4.6275 a 4.6275 a 1.5712 5.1878 a 1.0437 -0.6266 -0.7612 -0.8391
English vs. Scandinavian LO    .    . 0.7209 0.7209 -0.4594 -0.8571 -0.0220 0.9887
English vs. Socialist LO    .    . 1.2454 6.2361 a 7.8053 a 0.7793 3.4977 a 0.8830
French vs. German LO 0.4353 -0.1823 -0.2737 1.1049 -2.7554 a -0.5132 -1.2110 -2.0856 b
French vs. Scandinavian LO -1.2556 -1.5523 -0.8231 -1.6597 -3.4766 a -0.8208 -0.3581 0.5528
French vs. Socialist LO 4.8627 a 3.5453 a -0.2005 1.6077 1.0521 1.2042 3.4964 a 0.4941
German vs. Scandinavian LO -2.0226 c -2.0226 c -0.4523 -2.4552 b -0.9045 -0.2667 0.5169 1.4302
German vs. Socialist LO 5.3666 a 5.3666 a 0.0000 0.8000 3.4157 b 1.6000 4.0000 a 1.2649
Scandinavian vs. Socialist LO    .    . 0.3693 3.5277 a      . 1.8856 3.0867 b   .
      review
    Federalism
Note: 
a Significant at 1%; 
b Significant at 5%; 
c Significant at 10%
    admin. judge
    Case law     Rigidity of 
  Constitution
Panel D: Tests (t-statistics) of differences in means 
AMERICAN FREEDOM ENGLISH FREEDOM
      SC tenure      AC tenure     SC control AC         Power of       Judiciary Table 2a: Correlations of English and American freedom
SC tenure 1.0000
AC tenure 0.8325 a 1.0000
SC control AC 0.0114 0.2097 c 1.0000






Rigidity of Constitution 0.0313 0.0975 0.1513 0.0718 -0.0786 1.0000
Judiciary review 0.3356 a 0.3447 a 0.0699 0.1952 0.1887 0.2920 a 1.0000
Federalism 0.1128 0.1430 0.1183 0.1395 0.1149 0.0683 0.0984 1.0000
    Case law       SC tenure      AC tenure     SC control AC         Power of 
Correlations of English and American freedom variables for the sample of 71 countries around the world.  Variables are further defined 
Note: 
a Significant at 1%; 
b Significant at 5%; 
c Significant at 10%
ENGLISH FREEDOM
    Rigidity of 
  Constitution
     Judiciary 
      review
    Federalism
    admin. judge
AMERICAN FREEDOMTable 3: Freedom and Tenure of Supreme Court judges
Dependent Variables       SC tenure      Ethnolinguistic        Latitude        Ln GDP      Intercept     Adj. R
2
    fractionalization       per capita        [N]
Property rights index 0.9912 -0.8383 2.0276 1.5090 0.4422
67
0.6616 0.3954 -0.2016 0.5312 -1.8697 0.6655
67
Number of procedures -1.9430 -2.8278 -10.1709 16.5348 0.2901
54
-1.0022 -7.0781 -5.3473 -1.4518 26.7269 0.4114
54
Dependent Variables       SC tenure      Ethnolinguistic        Latitude        Ln GDP      Intercept     Adj. R
2
    fractionalization       per capita        [N]
Democracy index 2.0749 -3.6265 7.0857 1.2687 0.3394
70
1.5714 -1.7547 3.9585 0.7702 -3.6599 0.3832
70
Political rights index 1.2209 -1.0687 4.8699 1.3587 0.3937
69
0.8317 0.4029 2.3191 0.6171 -2.5795 0.4890
69
Human rights index 14.1100 -19.7762 44.9745 34.2196 0.3902
64
9.3509 -2.0528 16.8000 7.3130 -13.5567 0.5006
64
The table presents the resultso f OLS regressions. In Panel A, the dependent variables are two proxies
for economic freedom: (1) Property rights index; and (2) Number of procedures. In Panel B, the
dependent variables are three proxies for political freedom: (1) Democracy index; (2) Political rights
index; and (3) Human rights index. In both panels, the independent variables are: (1) Tenure of
Supreme Court judges; (2) Ethnolinguistic fractionalization; (3) Latitude; and (4) Ln GDP per capita.





























































a Significant at 1%; 
b Significant at 5%; 





Panel B: Results for political freedom
(4.8041) (11.9309) (15.2647)Table 4: Freedom and Tenure of administrative court judges 
Dependent Variables       AC tenure      Ethnolinguistic        Latitude       Ln GDP       Intercept     Adj. R
2
    fractionalization      per capita         [N]
Property rights index 0.9192 -0.7492 2.3569 1.5781 0.4731
67
0.7016 0.3803 -0.1108 0.5405 -1.9746 0.7155
67
Number of procedures -2.3610 -2.1598 -10.1651 16.9135 0.3453
54
-1.8361 -5.9900 -5.2164 -1.3740 27.0731 0.4585
54
Dependent Variables       AC tenure      Ethnolinguistic        Latitude       Ln GDP       Intercept     Adj. R
2
    fractionalization      per capita         [N]
Democracy index 1.7865 -3.3077 7.8816 1.5609 0.3375
70
1.4293 -1.4966 4.2463 0.8228 -3.8911 0.3900
70
Political rights index 0.9287 -0.7575 5.4418 1.6568 0.3683
69
0.6561 0.6664 2.4800 0.6603 -2.7041 0.4829
69
Human rights index 11.5435 -17.0519 51.1354 36.8237 0.3750
64
8.1801 -0.0846 18.7246 7.6951 -15.1398 0.5039
64
The table presents the resultso f OLS regressions. In Panel A, the dependent variables are two proxies
for economic freedom: (1) Property rights index; and (2) Number of procedures. In Panel B, the
dependent variables are three proxies for political freedom: (1) Democracy index; (2) Political rights
index; and (3) Human rights index. In both panels, the independent variables are: (1) Tenure of
administrative court judges; (2) Ethnolinguistic fractionalization; (3) Latitude; and (4) Ln GDP per
capita. Variables are further defined in Table 1. Robust standard errors are shown below the

























































a Significant at 1%; 
b Significant at 5%; 
c Significant at 10%
(15.0740)
Panel A: Results for economic freedom




(4.4160)Table 5: Freedom and Power of administrative law judges over executive
Dependent Variables          Power of      Ethnolinguistic       Latitude       Ln GDP        Intercept     Adj. R
2
    admin. judge     fractionalization      per capita         [N]
Property rights index 0.9565 -0.7498 2.6548 2.4067 0.3302
67
0.6693 0.5267 -0.1039 0.5924 -1.6991 0.6285
67
Number of procedures -4.2658 -0.7862 -10.4104 15.2125 0.4528
54
-3.5463 -4.2637 -6.0772 -1.1814 24.3003 0.5343
54
Dependent Variables          Power of      Ethnolinguistic        Latitude       Ln GDP        Intercept     Adj. R
2
    admin. judge     fractionalization      per capita         [N]
Democracy index 2.2319 -3.6649 8.2633 3.1259 0.3057
70
1.7310 -1.5971 4.2195 0.8980 -3.1639 0.3696
70
Political rights index 1.3343 -1.1140 5.5472 2.4532 0.3550
69
0.9879 0.4110 2.4195 0.6834 -2.3096 0.4806
69
Human rights index 17.2851 -21.4115 53.0525 45.9589 0.3624
64
13.5099 -3.6114 17.7614 8.0899 -11.7258 0.5107
64
Thet a ble presents the results of OLS regressions. In Panel A, the dependent variables are two proxies for
economic freedom: (1) Property rights index; and (2) Number of procedures. In Panel B, the dependent
variables are three proxies for political freedom: (1) Democracy index; (2) Political rights index; and (3)
Human rights index. In both panels, the independent variables are: (1) Power of administrative law
judges over executive; (2) Ethnolinguistic fractionalization; (3) Latitude; and (4) Ln GDP per capita.






























































a Significant at 1%; 
b Significant at 5%; 
c Significant at 10%
(16.2995)
Panel A: Results for economic freedom




(5.1725)Table 6: Freedom and Case law
Dependent Variables         Case law      Ethnolinguistic        Latitude       Ln GDP        Intercept     Adj. R
2
    fractionalization      per capita        [N]
Property rights index 1.0492 -0.7499 2.4296 2.4374 0.4040
66
0.7879 0.4371 -0.0520 0.5394 -1.3338 0.6394
66
Number of procedures -3.7405 -1.1487 -9.2081 14.6612 0.4015
54
-2.9035 -4.8299 -5.0741 -1.2193 24.1038 0.4867
54
Dependent Variables         Case law      Ethnolinguistic        Latitude       Ln GDP        Intercept     Adj. R
2
    fractionalization      per capita        [N]
Democracy index 2.0583 -3.4213 8.0665 3.2578 0.3295
69
1.6634 -1.7378 4.8436 0.7243 -1.8562 0.3678
69
Political rights index 0.8722 -0.6915 5.6782 2.5836 0.3493
68
0.5562 0.7395 2.8227 0.6307 -1.8486 0.4486
68
Human rights index 10.3310 -16.3091 55.2031 48.0300 0.3441
63
7.7503 -0.0081 22.5495 7.4064 -5.3860 0.4622
63
The table presents the results of OLS regressions. In Panel A, the dependent variables are two proxies for
economic freedom: (1) Property rights index; and (2) Number of procedures. In Panel B, the dependent
variables are three proxies for political freedom: (1) Democracy index; (2) Political rights index; and (3)
Human rights index. In both panels, the independent variables are: (1) Case law; (2) Ethnolinguistic
fractionalization; (3) Latitude; and (4) Ln GDP per capita. Variables are further defined in Table 1.


























































a Significant at 1%; 
b Significant at 5%; 
c Significant at 10%
(16.0239)
Panel A: Results for economic freedom
Panel B: Results for political freedom
a
(7.4357)
(5.8601)Table 7: Freedom and Rigidity of Constitution
Dependent Variables      Rigidity of      Ethnolinguistic        Latitude       Ln GDP        Intercept   Adj. R
2
    Constitution     fractionalization      per capita       [N]
Property rights index 0.2667 0.2830 3.1335 1.7974 0.2461
68
0.3925 1.3939 -0.2075 0.6585 -3.0799 0.5994
68
Number of procedures 0.3244 -4.2612 -11.9934 13.2645 0.2485
54
0.0945 -8.1052 -5.7932 -1.5684 26.1232 0.4006
54
Dependent Variables      Rigidity of      Ethnolinguistic        Latitude       Ln GDP        Intercept   Adj. R
2
    Constitution     fractionalization      per capita       [N]
Democracy index 0.3886 -1.2997 9.3715 2.3245 0.2496
71
0.5913 0.5640 4.2123 1.0555 -5.6172 0.3378
71
Political rights index 0.2227 0.3084 6.2387 1.9762 0.2884
70
0.3593 1.6425 2.4656 0.7651 -3.7230 0.4435
70
Human rights index 5.6146 -4.4592 58.5946 34.9543 0.2871
65
6.3220 11.7232 17.1477 9.0377 -31.9017 0.4693
65
The table presents the results of OLS regressions. In Panel A, the dependent variables are two proxies
for economic freedom: (1) Property rights index; and (2) Number of procedures. In Panel B, the
dependent variables are three proxies for political freedom: (1) Democracy index; (2) Political rights
index; and (3) Human rights index. In both panels, the independent variables are: (1) Rigidity of
Constitution; (2) Ethnolinguistic fractionalization; (3) Latitude; and (4) Ln GDP per capita. Variables





















































a Significant at 1%; 
b Significant at 5%; 
c Significant at 10%
(19.3675)
Panel A: Results for economic freedom




(3.2781)Table 8: Freedom and Judiciary review
Dependent Variables        Judiciary      Ethnolinguistic        Latitude       Ln GDP        Intercept     Adj. R
2
        review     fractionalization      per capita        [N]
Property rights index 0.5241 0.2472 3.6745 1.6286 0.3161
68
0.3638 1.2472 0.7374 0.5771 -2.1791 0.5832
68
Number of procedures 0.4902 -4.0728 -11.1291 13.0340 0.2523
54
0.9534 -8.0479 -3.9117 -1.7026 25.5083 0.4271
54
Dependent Variables        Judiciary      Ethnolinguistic        Latitude       Ln GDP        Intercept     Adj. R
2
        review     fractionalization      per capita        [N]
Democracy index 2.0429 -1.5073 11.1444 0.1528 0.3885
71
1.8112 -0.1149 7.3493 0.7624 -4.9167 0.4335
71
Political rights index 1.1947 0.1726 7.2414 0.7228 0.4499
70
1.0243 1.2658 4.2015 0.6068 -3.3071 0.5457
70
Human rights index 13.5585 -4.6834 75.1405 26.0351 0.4413
65
11.6614 8.8060 39.6463 7.4326 -24.7509 0.5612
65
The table presents the results of OLS regressions. In Panel A, the dependent variables are two proxies
for economic freedom: (1) Property rights index; and (2) Number of procedures. In Panel B, the
dependent variables are three proxies for political freedom: (1) Democracy index; (2) Political rights
index; and (3) Human rights index. In both panels, the independent variables are: (1) Judiciary
review; (2) Ethnolinguistic fractionalization; (3) Latitude; and (4) Ln GDP per capita. Variables are
































































a Significant at 1%; 
b Significant at 5%; 
c Significant at 10%
(14.9406)
Panel A: Results for economic freedom




(2.9294)Table 9: Freedom and Federalism
Dependent Variables      Federalism      Ethnolinguistic        Latitude       Ln GDP        Intercept    Adj. R
2
            fractionalization     per capita       [N]
Property rights index 0.7038 0.1651 3.0184 2.4387 0.2453
68
-0.0955 1.3952 0.3002 0.6296 -2.0367 0.5374
68
Number of procedures -1.9128 -3.9022 -10.8181 13.8550 0.2706
54
-0.2701 -7.9958 -5.6939 -1.5437 26.1231 0.4008
54
Dependent Variables      Federalism      Ethnolinguistic        Latitude       Ln GDP        Intercept    Adj. R
2
    fractionalization     per capita       [N]
Democracy index 3.3031 -1.8794 8.0669 3.4860 0.3028
71
2.2927 -0.2460 4.7161 0.8062 -2.3304 0.3496
71
Political rights index 1.8499 -0.0148 5.5135 2.6363 0.3453
70
1.0319 1.2714 2.8139 0.6419 -1.9636 0.4438
70
Human rights index 15.3198 -6.9911 54.4341 48.5642 0.2918
65
4.9910 10.1303 21.9468 8.3375 -12.7184 0.4296
65
The table presents the results of OLS regressions. In Panel A, the dependent variables are two proxies
for economic freedom: (1) Property rights index; and (2) Number of procedures. In Panel B, the
dependent variables are three proxies for political freedom: (1) Democracy index; (2) Political rights
index; and (3) Human rights index. In both panels, the independent variables are: (1) Federalism; (2)
Ethnolinguistic fractionalization; (3) Latitude; and (4) Ln GDP per capita. Variables are further




























































a Significant at 1%; 
b Significant at 5%; 
c Significant at 10%
(18.3752)
Panel A: Results for economic freedom
Panel B: Results for political freedom
a
(7.1904)
(5.0078)Table 10: Freedom, Judiciary review, and Power of administrative law judges over executive
Dependent Variables   Judiciary         Power of      Ethnolinguistic  Latitude   Ln GDP  Intercept Adj. R
2
   review    admin. judge     fractionalization  per capita    [N]
Property rights index 0.3854 0.8373 -0.6512 2.9898 1.8450 0.3832
67
0.2347 0.6094 0.5301 0.2224 0.5661 -1.8591 0.6475
67
Number of procedures 0.4113 -4.2454 -0.6351 -9.8534 14.3932 0.4580
54
0.7792 -3.4370 -4.3184 -4.5973 -1.2972 23.6388 0.5520
54
Dependent Variables   Judiciary         Power of      Ethnolinguistic  Latitude   Ln GDP  Intercept Adj. R
2
   review    admin. judge     fractionalization  per capita   [N]
Democracy index 1.7578 1.6275 -3.1965 9.9650 0.5028 0.4076
70
1.5573 1.2966 -1.5994 6.5431 0.7168 -4.2184 0.4470
70
Political rights index 1.0306 0.9987 -0.8656 6.5178 0.9281 0.4755
69
0.8759 0.7521 0.4042 3.6911 0.5858 -2.9255 0.5651
69
Human rights index 11.4438 13.9660 -18.3961 66.0296 28.0959 0.4934
64


















































































The table presents the results of OLS regressions. In Panel A, the dependent variables are two proxies
for economic freedom: (1) Property rights index; and (2) Number of procedures. In Panel B, the
dependent variables are three proxies for political freedom: (1) Democracy index; (2) Political rights
index; and (3) Human rights index. In both panels, the independent variables are: (1) Judiciary review;
(2) Power of administrative law judges over executive; (3) Ethnolinguistic fractionalization; (4)
Latitude; and (5) Ln GDP per capita. Variables are further defined in Table 1. Robust standard errors
are shown below the coefficients in parentheses.
Panel A: Results for economic freedom
Panel B: Results for political freedom
Note: 
a Significant at 1%; 
b Significant at 5%; 




(0.6680)Table 11: Freedom and Legal origin
Dependent Variables English       Socialist      German           Scandinavian              Ethnolinguistic        Latitude        Ln GDP         Intercept Adj. R
2
        LO       LO         LO            LO             fractionalization       per capita [N]
Property rights index 1.0645 -2.0653 1.3088 -0.6748 -0.9183 2.1264 2.7325 0.5433
68
0.8443 -1.2815 0.9233 0.5279 0.1298 0.3440 0.4325 -0.4237 0.6665
68
Number of procedures -5.9878 1.4577 -1.4986 -5.2365 2.0168 -6.5578 13.0464 0.5985
54
-5.1767 -0.7244 -0.6398 -4.8626 -1.4142 -3.4046 -1.0308 21.3653 0.6445
54
Panel A: Results for economic freedom
Note: 
a Significant at 1%; 
b Significant at 5%; 






























The table presents the results of OLS regressions. In Panel A, the dependent variables are two proxies for economic freedom: (1) Property








(0.4022)Dependent Variables English       Socialist      German           Scandinavian              Ethnolinguistic        Latitude        Ln GDP         Intercept Adj. R
2
        LO         LO         LO            LO             fractionalization       per capita [N]
Democracy index 1.2845 -6.1652 2.2393 1.0206 -3.3933 7.3810 4.1605 0.4051
71
1.0772 -5.3563 1.7836 0.8515 -2.3064 5.6482 0.4403 0.9091 0.4173
71
Political rights index 0.5515 -3.6059 1.2957 0.4511 -0.7511 5.1566 3.0632 0.4567
70
0.3298 -2.7455 0.8842 0.2883 0.4059 3.2763 0.4676 -0.3784 0.5036
70
Human rights index 5.5523 -43.3675 10.4564 13.8583 -17.0199 43.5134 55.7871 0.4716
65
3.7557 -32.5717 6.1820 12.1566 -3.7990 22.8380 5.4581 14.4861 0.5235
65
Panel B: Results for political freedom
Note: 
a Significant at 1%; 
b Significant at 5%; 
c Significant at 10%
a









































(0.9017)Table 12: Economic freedom with English freedom and Legal origin
Dependent Variable SC tenure  AC tenure     Scandinavian     Ethnolinguistic   Latitude Adj. R
2
   admin. Judge          LO     fractionalization   [N]
Property rights index 0.5012 0.6299 -0.5848 1.0196 0.4336 -0.1752 -0.2060 0.4299 -0.9050 0.7340
67
0.5493 0.4849 -0.5711 0.8546 0.1914 -0.0562 0.0044 0.4521 -1.1400 0.7607
67
0.5675 0.5527 1.1897 1.0676 0.2706 -0.2541 0.0780 0.4297 -0.3801 0.7306
67
0.4291 0.4966 -1.2196 0.5869 0.1277 -0.0026 0.2074 0.4486 -0.5150 0.6972
66












































a Significant at 1%; 
b Significant at 5%; 
c Significant at 10%





The table presents the results of OLS regressions. In Panel A, the dependent variable is Property rights index. In Panel B, the dependent variable is Number of
procedures. In both panels, the independent variables are: (1) Tenure of Supreme Court judges; (2) Tenure of administrative court judges; (3) Power of
administrative law judges over executive; (4) Case law; (5) Legal origin dummyvariables; (6) Ethnolinguistic fractionalization; (7) Latitude; and (8) Ln GDP per







Panel A: Results for Property rights indexDependent Variable SC tenure  AC tenure     Scandinavian      Ethnolinguistic   Latitude Adj. R
2
   admin. judge         LO     fractionalization   [N]
Number of procedures -1.4130 -5.0578 -3.2959 -1.1813 -4.9085 -0.8813 -2.3752 -1.0425 23.6251 0.6536
54
-1.7038 -4.7191 -3.6928 -0.8119 -4.3015 -0.9424 -2.6599 -1.1208 24.6013 0.6768
54
-2.5673 -4.4907 -1.5946 -1.6557 4.2985 0.1555 -3.8082 -0.8280 20.8097 0.7002
54
-1.2708 -4.5591 -1.1073 0.0144 -3.9646 -0.8948 -3.4807 -1.0119 21.5612 0.6562
54


























































Panel B: Results for Number of procedures
Note: 
a Significant at 1%; 
b Significant at 5%; 
c Significant at 10%
 Power of Case law English  Socialist German Ln GDP Intercept
LO  LO  LO per capitaAppendix: Dependent variables by country and Legal origin
Country Property rights index Number of procedures Democracy index Political rights index Human rights index
Australia 5 2 10 7 91
Bangladesh 2.95 5 9
Canada 5 2 10 7 94
Ghana 31 01 45 3
India 3 11 8 4 54
Ireland 5 3 10 7 94
Israel 4597 7 6
Kenya 3901 4 6
Liberia ..0 1.
Malaysia 4784 6 1
Nepal 3 . 8 5 69
New Zealand 5 3 10 7 98
Nigeria 3901 4 9
Pakistan 4885 4 2
Saudi Arabia 5.01 2 9
Singapore 5623 6 0
South Africa 3987 5 0
Thailand 5865 6 2
Uganda 41 10 34 6
United Kingdom 5 4 10 7 93
United States 5 3 10 7 90
Zambia 3565 5 7
Zimbabwe 3503 6 5
English average 3.95 6.32 5.78 4.61 65.36
DEPENDENT VARIABLES
Panel A: Data for Countries of English Legal origin
This table classifies countries by Legal origin and shows the value of each dependent variable for each country. Panel A shows
the values for English Legal origin countries, Panel B shows the values for French Legal origin countries, and Panel C shows the
values for German, Scandinavian, and Socialist Legal origin countries. Exact definitions of each of the dependent variables can be
found in Table 1.Country Property rights index Number of procedures Democracy index Political rights index Human rights index
Algeria 3.02 6 6
Argentina 41 38 68 4
Belgium 5 7 10 7 96
Brazil 3 11 10 6 69
Chile 5 10 9 6 80
Colombia 31 79 46 0
Ecuador . 16 9 6 83
Egypt, Arab Republic 3 11 0 2 50
Ethiopia 2 . 2 4 .
France 4 15 8 7 94
Greece 4 15 10 7 87
Haiti 1 . 8 3 .
Honduras 3 . 6 5 65
Indonesia 31 10 13 4
Iran, Islamic 1 . 0 2 22
Iraq 1 . 0 1 17
Italy 41 1 1 079 0
Jordan 4 12 4 4 65
Kuwait 5.03 3 3
Lebanon 3922.
Libya 1.01 2 4
Mexico 3 15 1 4 64
Mozambique 2 19 6 5 53
Netherlands 5 6 10 7 98
Nicaragua 2.64 7 5
Panama 3786 8 1
Peru 3623 5 4
Philippines 4986 7 2
Portugal 4 10 10 7 92
Spain 41 09 78 7
Syrian Arab Republic 2 . 0 1 30
Turkey 41 29 34 4
Venezuela 31 48 57 5
French average 3.16 11.57 5.52 4.36 64.80
DEPENDENT VARIABLES
Panel B: Data for Countries of French Legal originCountry Property rights index Number of procedures Democracy index Political rights index Human rights index
Austria 5 8 10 7 95
Germany 5 8 10 7 98
Japan 5 11 10 7 82
South Korea 5 11 10 6 59
Switzerland 5 7 10 7 96
Taiwan .86..
German average 5.00 8.83 9.33 6.80 86.00
Denmark 5 3 10 7 98
Finland 5 3 10 7 99
Iceland 5 . 10 7 .
Norway 5 4 10 7 97
Sweden 4 4 10 7 98
Scandinavian average 4.80 3.50 10.00 7.00 98.00
China 21 00 12 1
Cuba 1.01 3 0
North Korea 1 . 0 1 20
Vietnam 11 60 12 7
Socialist average 1.25 13.00 0.00 1.00 24.50
DEPENDENT VARIABLES
Panel C: Data for Countries of German, Scandinavian, and Socialist Legal origin